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Abstract 
 
In this study, we explore the impact of private label (PL) proliferation and pricing on 
consumer demand and derive profit implications for different scenarios: (i) dropping or 
adding a line (kids, health or muesli) within a PL tier and (ii) changing the PL tier prices. We 
use a representative household panel dataset (2008-2009) for the ready to eat (RTE) cereal 
category of two leading U.K. grocery retailers. Our results indicate line extension/delisting 
within the standard and premium PL tiers cannibalize each other and also steal business from 
NBs for the kids, healthy and muesli lines. Overall, premium PLs seem a profit generator tier 
that allows some room for further brand variant introductions within this tier. However, the 
retailer is better off, in terms of profits, if the proliferation within the economy PL tier is 
downgraded. Furthermore, both the retailer and NB manufacturers gain from an economy, 
standard and premium PL price increase, as it leads to a demand shift to NBs accompanied by 
a profit lift for the retailer.    
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1. Introduction  
One of the most salient changes in the grocery environment is the success of private labels (PLs).  
Since a large number of FMCG categories now already have at least one PL, retailers are 
increasingly adopting a multi-tiered PL strategy. In practice, this often means a switch from a single 
standard product offering to a three-tiered PL portfolio. This ranges from the typical cheap and low 
quality own labels (i.e., economy PLs) to somewhat less expensive PLs comparable in quality to the 
national brands (NBs) (i.e., standard PLs), to premium quality and high value added PLs (i.e., 
premium PLs) (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007). With this strategy retailers can satisfy the 
heterogeneous nature of consumers, and further create differentiation compared to their competitors 
(IRI 2016). For instance, Italian retailer Conad states that they grew in all channels primarily thanks 
to a multi-tier PL program, which they started a few years ago (Global Retail Mag 2013). Examples 
of retailers who launched a new economy or premium PL tier are international grocery chain 7-
Eleven (Just Food 2015) in U.S. and Korean retailer Lotte (IGD 2014). In the same spirit, recently 
an increasing number of leading retailers have extended their PL tier offerings with new alternatives 
targeted to distinct consumer segments (IPLG Europe 2014), such as health and kids lines (e.g. 
Good For You at U.K. retailer Asda and Conad Kids at Italian retailer Conad). Likewise, U.S. 
retailer Kroger has expanded its organic and healthy (standard and premium) PL lines recently 
(Market Watch 2012). In the meantime, industry observers increasingly state that economy PLs are 
facing big challenges. They are shrinking in volume sold since they fail to compete with discounters 
(IRI 2016). Moreover, they generate lower margins than standard PLs and most importantly they 
can cannibalize the current PL offerings that in the end leads category profit erosion (ter Braak et al. 
2013; IPLG 2016). On the other hand, standard PL tier keeps its popularity and premium PLs is 
actually growing not only in size but also in value (IRI 2016). That brings us to evaluate what is the 
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impact of this further proliferation within the tiers on consumer demand and retailer profits. In other 
words, whether new line introductions or delistings within different tiers help retailers. Together 
with this further proliferation in PL tier offerings, there is an ongoing discussion on how different 
PL tiers should be priced relative to each other and their NB competitors. The top retailers in U.K. 
(i.e. Tesco, Sainsbury’s and Asda) have increased the price of economy PLs more than 40 per cent 
on average (Daily Mail 2012). Likewise, according to IRI, U.K. shopping basket data show that 
prices of standard PL items are slowly getting closer to NBs’ prices (Just Food 2013; IRI 2016). 
Similarly, although industry observers advise the retailers to set their premium PLs price more than 
NB counterparts, there is still little known about how premium PLs should be priced (Millward 
Brown 2008 and World Trademark Review 2012).  
Hence, this PL proliferation to new quality tiers (i.e. economy, standard and premium) and 
the further line proliferation within each tier pose challenges to a retailer's PL-NB portfolio 
management and price setting. Within a retailer, how do the different PL tiers/lines compete with 
each other and with the existing NBs in the assortment? And, how does this PL-NB competition 
influence consumer demand and retailer's profits? To answer these questions, we estimate a rich 
discrete choice demand model at the consumer level. The adopted approach allows us to derive 
demand and profit implications for different scenarios by calculating counterfactuals. More 
specifically, we derive the demand and profit effects under the following set of scenarios: (i) 
dropping or adding a line (kids, health or muesli) within a PL tier and (ii) changing the PL tier 
prices. By predicting consumer purchase adjustments to these changes in a retailer’s PL-NB 
portfolio, we can define which PL/NB tiers and lines win or lose in terms of demand. Moreover, we 
derive what happens to a retailer’s profits, addressing the recent call for more PL studies on profit 
implications (see Sethuraman and Gielens 2014). 
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Insights on PL tiers in the academic literature are limited, as the majority of articles studying 
PLs do not make the distinction between different PL tiers. These studies regard PLs as one group 
(e.g. Lamey et al. 2012; Steenkamp and Geyskens 2014), or consider one specific tier (e.g. Pauwels 
and Srinivasan 2004). Nonetheless, ter Braak et al. (2014) study the category drivers of premium PL 
introduction. Among other things, they find that retailers are more likely to introduce premium PLs 
in categories with a more proliferated assortment in terms of standard PLs, still being aware of 
creating PL fatigue. Based on online experiments, Plameira and Thomas (2011) showed that 
consumers’ quality perceptions of a premium PL increase in the presence of a value PL, whereas 
quality perceptions of a value PL are not affected by the presence of a premium PL alternative. In 
addition, Geyskens and colleagues (2010) show that, based on a brand-choice model with context 
effects, the introduction of an economy PL cannibalizes the incumbent standard PL but benefits the 
mainstream NBs. Similarly, an introduction of a premium PL cannibalizes the incumbent PLs (i.e. 
budget and standard) and sometimes benefits premium-quality NBs. Gielens (2012) studies the 
impact of PL and NB introductions on category sales and the share of the top-3 NBs and the three 
PL tiers (aggregated over brand variants). She finds, among other things, that new products 
introduced by standard PLs and premium PLs are  sometimes able to boost category sales, to shrink 
NB rivals’ shares, and to cannibalize other PL tiers (respectively, economy and premium, and only 
economy), whereas new products introduced under the economy PL flag only stimulates overall 
economy PL share. We contribute to this literature stream in multiple ways. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to study the demand implications of (i) further line proliferation within 
PL tiers (rather than PL tier introductions (see Geykens et al. 2010
1
 & Palmeira and Thomas 2011) 
                                                          
1
 Compared to Geyskens et al. (2010),  we consider a lower level of aggregation in our demand model, where we only 
aggregate across different product sizes but not brand variants (i.e. different formulation, taste, …). This allows us to 
study the introduction and delisting of PL lines within each PL tier. Second, our model allows consumers’ price 
sensitivity to differ not only between consumers but also between brand types (i.e. NB vs. PL), quality tiers (i.e. low, 
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– or new product introductions within a PL tier (see Gielens 2012)) and (ii) different PL tier price 
settings. Finally, besides the demand implications of further proliferation and price decisions within 
the multi-tier PL strategy, we study the profit implications for the retailer.   
In sum, the study aims to answer the following research questions: How do PL lines/ tiers and 
NBs compete within a retailer? What are the demand and profit implications of this competition for 
the retailer? The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief 
overview of the data, followed by a section that presents the empirical framework with more detail 
regarding the method of estimation. In section 4, we present the empirical results. In section 5, 
what-if scenarios are discussed in detail. Finally, we conclude with discussion, limitations and ideas 
for further research in section 6. 
2. Data  
Research Context 
To study the competition between PLs and NBs, we obtained U.K. household panel data from 
Kantar Worldpanel through AiMark. This panel data consists of purchase records of a representative 
set of 2,353 U.K. households that shop in the ready to eat cereal (RTE) cereal category for the 
period between January 1, 2008 and 31 December, 2009.   
The U.K. has one of the strongest PL presences in Europe and is considered as the most 
advanced and sophisticated PL country globally with a (volume) market share of over 45% (IRI 
2015; PLMA 2016). One of the most distinctive features of the U.K. grocery market is that PLs 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
medium and high) and lines (i.e. kids, health), allowing us to better capture the implications of price changes.  In 
addition, Geyksens et al. (2010) ignore the observations in which no purchase occurs in the category at the retailer, 
which is problematic due to informative-missingness (Chib, Seetharaman and Strijnev 2004). As such, our model is 
extended with an outside good option that captures the consumers’ decision to purchase in the category at another 
retailer, and thus allows consumers to switch to offerings of competing retailers in response to an assortment or price 
changes at the focal retailer (Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song 2002), which again results in more realistic substitution 
patterns. Finally, whereas Geyskens et al. (2010) study demand shifts due to an introduction of an economy and 
premium PL tier over time (going from 1993 to 2006), our study studies consumer demand in a setting where all three 
PL tiers and its lines are already well-established in the market (i.e. 2008-2009). 
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present in virtually every product category for several decades (Burt 2000). Hence, in our estimation 
window, the U.K. Market is already a mature PL market where all the brand introductions were 
made several years ago and consumers are well aware of the three PL tiers and theirs line 
extensions. According to industry observers, many countries are headed towards the U.K. model 
(Cotterill 1997), which makes our time window representative for other countries moving slower in 
their PL lines development. In our observation period, economy, standard and premium PLs cover 
respectively 2.96%, 23.64% and .27% of the RTE cereal volume sales across all retailers. The 
outstanding success of PLs in the U.K. can largely be attributed to the fact that 74% of the retail 
grocery market is held by the top four retailers (The Guardian 2013). Indeed, the empirical literature 
and the industry findings show that the level of concentration in the retail market is directly related 
to the market share of PLs in total retail sales (Bozhinova 2014; Tarziján 2003; Nielsen 2014). High 
concentration in grocery retailing is the key factor behind the high market share of PLs in UK (PWC 
2011). Hence the current PL market structure, where these multi-tiered PL offerings are pioneered 
(Kumar and Steenkamp 2007) makes U.K. an interesting place to study. 
In our analysis, we focus on two of the three largest retailers in the U.K. grocery market, 
namely Asda and Sainsbury’s. Asda (Sainsbury’s) is the second (third) largest retailer in the U.K. 
grocery market with 525 (597) stores and a market share of 17.1 (16.4%) in 2016 (Asda Supplier 
2016; J Sainsbury plc 2016). Both retailers offer a popular PL assortment fitting into the 3-tier 
ranging strategy: ‘Good’ (i.e. (Asda’s) Smart Price, Sainsbury’s Basics), ‘Better’ (i.e. (Asda’s) 
Chosen by You, Sainsbury’s) and ‘Best’ (i.e. (Asda’s) Extra Special, (Sainsbury’s) Taste the 
Difference), accounting for 45.8% at Asda and 50.8% at Sainsbury’s of total volume sales (The 
Grocer 2014).  
To answer our research questions, we obtained data for the RTE cereal category. The RTE 
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cereal category is a large, mature category for both PLS and NBs, where more than 40% of U.K. 
consumers regularly buy PLs (YouGov 2013). The RTE cereal category consists of a large number 
of brand variants (e.g. honey, chocolate, blueberry) grouped within multiple lines
2
 (e.g. kids, health, 
muesli) of several PLs and NBs in the different quality tiers, making it a perfect category to study 
the competition between PLs and NBs across tiers, lines and brand variants. Importantly, no re-
brandings of PLs and NBs, or major PL or NB entries or exits occurred in our two year observation 
period.  
Level of Aggregation  
The majority of marketing studies aggregate SKU’s at the brand level (see for instance Geyskens et 
al. 2010, Horsky et al. 2012 and Gordon et al. 2013). In our research setting, where we focus on 
brand variants to derive competition, this would lead to an aggregation bias. In fact, SKU’s in the 
RTE cereal category varies in terms of size, flavor and main ingredient (i.e. corn, barley, oat). But, 
even more importantly, each SKU (irrespective of size) of the same brand considerably varies in 
terms of its pricing. Therefore, we only aggregate SKUs across sizes and not across brand variants, 
and call it "brand variant".
3
  
In line with Empen et al. (2011), we select for each retailer all brand variants with a volume 
share above 0.5%.
4
 This results in 63 (57) selected brand variants at Asda (Sainsbury’s) which 
belong to four NB mother brands, namely Kellogg’s, Nestle and Weetabix, Quaker and all PL tiers, 
accounting for 79 (82%) of the RTE cereal category volume sales at Asda (Sainsbury’s).  
                                                          
2
 Some brand variants are classified to more than one line. In Sainsbury’s, 7% of the brand variants are classified as both 
muesli and healthy cereal. In Asda, we don’t see such overlapping. 
3
 For instance, under the mother brand flag Kellogg’s, Kellogg’s Special K brand offers the following brand variants 
among others: Kellogg’s Special K (regular), Kellogg’s Special K Red Fruit, Kellogg’s Special K Yogurt, where the 
different package sizes (e.g. Kellogg’s Special K Red Fruit 500g and 300g ) are aggregated within a brand variant. 
4
 For the premium PL tier, we relaxed this rule and include all PL brands (and its corresponding brand variants) where 
the combined market share of all brand variants is above 0.5%, in order to include sufficient PL premium alternatives in 
our analysis.  
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 We adopt the expert-based classification used by Geyskens et al. (2010) to group each brand 
variant into a quality tier, i.e. low, medium or high. Taking into account the brand type (i.e. NB vs. 
PL), this results in five groups: mainstream NB (medium quality, i.e. Nestlé & Weetabix), premium 
NB (high quality; i.e. Kellogg’s), economy PL (low quality; i.e. Sainsbury’s Basics), standard PL 
(medium quality) and premium PL (high quality). Table 1 gives an overview of the average price 
paid, market share and level of proliferation for each group and each retailer. Overall, the economy 
PLs are standing at the bottom-of-the-market as a lowest priced option, followed by the standard 
PLs and subsequently premium PLs are positioned close to NBs, which is in line with Kumar and 
Steenkamp (2007). The number of brand variants and SKUs are comparable for standard PL, 
mainstream NB and premium NBs, while it is considerably lower for economy and premium PLs.  
At both retailers PLs have a combined (volume) market share above 40% (i.e. 47.7% at Asda and 
44% at Sainsbury’s). Despite these overall similarities, the chosen PL price strategy clearly differs 
between both retailers. The price gaps between the different PL tiers at Asda are much smaller than 
at Sainsbury’s, whereas the Sainsbury’s PL tier prices cover a much broader spectrum going from 
0.87 for their economy PLs to 2.87 for the premium PLs compared to 1.00 and 2.41, respectively, at 
Asda. In addition, the Asda assortment is more proliferated  in terms of the number of SKUs. The 
only exception is the premium tier, where Asda only offers 3 cereal alternatives compared to 27 at 
Sainsbury’s.  
                                                       Table 1: Summary statistics 
  
Mean Price  
(price per kilo) 
Market Share 
(volume) 
# Brand Variants # SKUs 
  Sainsbury’s Asda Sainsbury’s Asda Sainsbury’s Asda Sainsbury’s Asda 
Economy PL 0.87 1 4.23% 7.00% 4 8 20 46 
Standard PL 1.98 2.06 34.02% 40.40% 15 23 145 283 
Premium PL 2.87 2.41 6.15% 0.30% 6 2 27 3 
Mainstream NB 3.54 3.63 27.48% 21.60% 20 15 146 189 
Premium NB 3.7 3.45 28.12% 30.60% 12 12 144 225 
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We further classify each brand variant in lines. More specifically, we distinguish brand variants into 
kids, health, muesli and regular RTE cereal lines. Brand variants are classified as a “kids” line 
alternative if the product package carries a picture of a cartoon or another kids friendly image 
(Ulger, 2008). Cereals based on raw rolled oats and other ingredients including grains, fresh or dried 
fruits, seeds and nuts, are classified as “muesli” cereals. To determine whether the alternative is 
healthy or not, we check whether brand variants are advertised as a healthy cereal with a specific 
name/range (e.g. Kellogg’s Red Berry Special K, Sainsbury’s Be Good To Yourself range) and/or 
whether they are emphasizing the health on its packaging (e.g. ‘good source of fiber’ or ‘made with 
wholegrain’). 
Household Selection  
In line with Seetharaman (2004) and Geyskens et al. (2010), we exclude households that did not 
purchase one of the selected brand variants at least four times per year, on average, as well as 
households for which the selected brand variants did not represent minimum 70% of their yearly 
category purchases at the retailer.  
 
3. Methodology  
Demand Model 
To answer our research questions, we apply a rich random coefficients logit model for the RTE 
category for each retailer. The indirect latent utility of household 𝑖 from buying brand variant 𝑗 
during weekly shopping trip 𝑡 at the retailer is given by5: 
                                                          
5
 For some households in certain weeks, multiple shopping trips within a week are observed, which is the case for 
40.75% of the observed shopping trips. In this case we only selected the first shopping trip of the specific week for 
analysis. However, the same substantive findings are obtained (i) if we allow for daily instead of weekly shopping trips, 
or (ii) if these multiple weekly observations for a household are retained by using different household id’s for each 
additional shopping trip with a week but with identical household characteristics. In addition, some households buy 
multiple brand variants at the same weekly shopping trip, which is the case for 22,38% of the observed shopping trips. 
For the sake of simplicity, we only included the first brand variant registered in the panel dataset for that household at 
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  𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 (1) 
where 𝛾𝑖𝑗 denotes a household i’s valuation for brand variant j  (relative to the base option which is 
outside good). The assortment variable 𝑋𝑗𝑡 
6
 quantifies the number of SKU’s available for brand 
variant 𝑗, and 𝛽𝑖 captures a household i’s valuation with respect to the assortment variable. 
Furthermore, 𝑝𝑗𝑡 is average price paid across all households for brand variant 𝑗 at week t, converted 
in real terms using the yearly U.K. consumer price index obtained from the Office for National 
Statistics in the U.K., and 𝛼𝑖 is a household-specific valuation of price. 𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes a dynamic 
loyalty variable, suggested by Guadagni and Little (2008) and specified as: 
 𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜆𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2) 
where 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when brand variant 𝑗 was last purchased at 
the retailer, and 0 otherwise, 𝜆 is a smoothing constant between 0 and 17 (see Melis et al. 2015 for a 
similar practice). Hence, the parameter 𝜃𝑖 captures a household's "loyalty" or "switching cost" of 
moving from one brand variant to another (Gordon et al. 2013; Guadagni and Little 2008). 
Unobserved brand variant characteristics, 𝜉𝑗𝑡, may include brand variant image, quality and 
assigned shelf space. Finally, 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a household i specific valuation for brand variant 𝑗 in week t i.e. 
the “logit error term”. It is identically and independently distributed across brand variants according 
to the Type I extreme value distribution. 
In order for our model to yield plausible and realistic substitution patterns among the brand 
variants offered by the focal retailer, it is necessary to include an "outside good" option (Nevo 
2001). In our research setting, the outside good option (𝑗 = 0) for the brand-variant choice decision 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
the specific at Sainsbury’s. However, similar findings are obtained if we randomly select a brand variant out of all brand 
variants bought by a household at a specific shopping trip.  
6
 The competitive effects such as the assortment depth of other PL tiers and NB tiers are not directly enter the utility in 
Equation (1). However, they affect the choice probabilities. 
7
 In line with prior research (Spotts 2014; Gupta 1988 and Kalwani et al. 1990), the smoothing constant is set equal to 
0.7. Still, the same substantive findings are obtained for alternative smoothing constants (0.6, 0.75 and 0.87).  
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is to purchase cereal from any other grocery retailer in the U.K. market. Without incorporating the 
existence of an outside good option, a simultaneous increase in the price of all brand variants 
offered by our focal retailer would result in no change in total consumption at the retailer. This 
would ignore the fact that consumers are able to buy their cereals at competing retailers.  
We consider a specification that allows for both observed and unobserved household 
heterogeneity regarding the valuations of alternatives. The alternative j evaluations, 𝛾𝑖𝑗, and the 
price sensitivity, 𝛼𝑖, may depend on both observed household characteristics and unobserved 
heterogeneity. Based prior literature and data availability, we include the following observed 
household characteristics: Number of Childreni, Social Classi (i.e. lower versus middle versus 
upper), Average Buying Frequencyi and Share of Walleti. Average Buying Frequencyi denotes how 
many times on average a household shops for cereal at Sainsbury’s during a 4 week time window 
(Bodapati and Gupta 2005). Share of Walleti represents the household’s average spending on cereal 
in the focal retailer relative to all other U.K. retailers (Ailawadi et al. 2008; Gordon et al. 2013). 
Unobserved heterogeneity is incorporated through a random coefficient approach.  
With regard to the valuations for the different alternatives, we specify two terms: one for the 
outside good (3) and one for the brand variants (4): 
                     𝛾𝑖0 = 𝛾0
0 + 𝛾0
𝜎𝜈𝑖
𝑟              𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0,1)    (3) 
 𝛾𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑗
0 + ∑ ∑ 𝛾ℎ𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝐺𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑝
𝑝ℎ
 (4) 
where 𝛾𝑗
0 captures the means of the distributions of heterogeneity across households with respect to 
intrinsic brand variant 𝑗 preferences. In order to capture the observed heterogeneity for the valuation 
of product group dummy variables, we interact product group dummies (𝑃𝐺𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑝) with 
household characteristics 𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑖, where 𝑝 is an index for the product groups and ℎ𝑖 is an index 
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for observed household characteristics. 8, 9 
With regard to the valuation of price, we specify the price coefficient as: 
 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼
0 + ∑ 𝛼ℎ𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑖 + 𝛼
𝜎𝜈𝑖
𝑟                    𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0,1)    
ℎ
 (5) 
where 𝛼0 is the mean responsiveness to the price, common across households. To account for 
observed heterogeneity, we interact price with the above mentioned observed household 
characteristics 𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑖. To account for unobserved heterogeneity, we use a random coefficient 
specification for price (Chintagunta et al. 2002). Here, 𝛼𝜎 is the standard deviation around the mean 
valuation of price and 𝜐𝑖 is a random draw from the standard normal distribution, capturing 
unobserved household heterogeneity regarding price
10
. 
Estimation 
Based on the model assumptions, the probability that household 𝑖 with unobservable characteristic 
vector 𝑣𝑖 chooses the brand variant 𝑗 that maximizes utility among all the available alternatives is 
given by: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗(𝑣𝑖) =
exp (𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡)
1 + ∑ exp ( 𝛾𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑘𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑘𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡)
𝐽
𝑘=1
 (6) 
 
These choice probabilities can be integrated over the unobserved and normally distributed term 𝑣𝑖, 
to obtain average choice probabilities for each household. We then estimate the model with 
simulated maximum likelihood as in Chintagunta and Dube (2005) and Train (2003). To 
approximate the integral in the choice probability, we take 100 draws for 𝜐𝑖 from the standard 
                                                          
8
 The product group dummies refers to both (i) line dummies  (i.e. kids, muesli and health) and  (ii) group dummies (i.e. 
brand type vs. quality tiers) (i.e. economy PL, standard PL, premium PL, mainstream NB and premium NB). 
9
 The mean valuation of the product group dummies were dropped from the model due to multicollinearity problems as 
individual brand variant dummies are also included in the model. 
10 In the special case where 𝛼𝜎 = 0, there is no unobserved heterogeneity and we would obtain the conditional logit 
model. 
13 
 
normal distribution (see Appendix for the details).       
Counterfactuals  
To conduct our counterfactuals, we compute diversion ratios to compute how closely brand variants 
and product groups compete with each other; and its corresponding profit implications.  
 Diversion ratio. A diversion ratio quantifies the proportion of demand captured by the 
different alternatives in the market when price of one of the alternatives is changed (see 
Kelchtermans and Verboven (2007) and Conlon and Mortimer (2013) for an in-depth discussion). A 
practical advantage of the diversion ratio is that it is a unit free measure, which captures the relative 
degree of competition between products very well. As such, it gives similar magnitudes when one 
considers substitution responses to small or larger price changes, or to an entire product elimination. 
We consider here the effect of an elimination of all brand variants in group 𝛿1 (i.e. dropping a tier) 
from the retailer’s assortment, which is the special case where the prices in the group become 
infinitely large. In this case, 𝐷𝑅𝛿1𝛿2 measures the fraction of demand lost from the eliminated group 
𝛿1 that flows back to the group 𝛿2.  
 
𝐷𝑅𝛿1𝛿2 =
∑ ∑ (𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑘∈𝛿2 (𝒑
𝟏) − 𝑠𝑖𝑘(𝒑
𝟎)𝑖 )
∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗(𝑗∈𝛿1 𝒑
𝟎)𝑖
 (7) 
The initial price vector 𝒑𝟎 consists of the current prices of all brand variants, and the new price 
vector 𝒑𝟏 sets the price to infinity for the eliminated brands j in the group 𝛿1. For example, to 
capture the demand implications of a PL tier line delisting, the prices of all brand variants within 
this PL tier line are replaced with a very  high price (such that its demand 𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) becomes zero 
where 𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗(𝒑
𝟏)𝑖 ) while keeping the prices of the other brand variants at the same level in 
the new price vector. The diversion ratios measure the percentage of PL tier  line demand that goes 
to each brand variant. Similarly, to capture the demand implications of an introduction of a PL tier 
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line, we generate a hypothetical price level, assortment level and loyalty value for all new brand 
variants within this PL tier line
11
. Note that the diversion ratio formula (7) is a special case of a 
finite price increase for the products in group 𝛿1. 12 We finally point out that the concept of the 
diversion ratio is closely related to own- and cross-price elasticities
13
 (see e.g. Werden (1998)). In 
both cases, the prices of rival products are kept fixed; in profit counterfactuals, one can allow prices 
of rivals to respond.  
 Profit. We also consider the profit incentives for eliminating (i) a group of brand variants, 
and (ii) changing the price gap between PL tiers and NB tiers. In order to calculate the net effects on 
category profit, we supplement our data with the external margin information
14
 𝑚𝑗
0 = (𝑝𝑗
0 − 𝑐𝑗)/𝑝𝑗
0 
that allows us to derive wholesale price 𝑐𝑗. For PL tiers, we obtained average margin data per brand 
type & tier for our focal category (i.e. RTE cereal) from AiMark (for a comparable retailer in the 
Dutch market) together with the accompanying standard deviation. Retailers’ percentage profit 
margins 𝑚𝑗
0 are 21.6% for economy PLs, 34.5% for standard PLs and 28.3% for premium PLs on 
average. Similarly, for NBs, it is  20%. Suppose that there is a price increase of all brands j in group 
𝛿1 (either a finite price increase, or an infinite increase in case the product is eliminated). The 
change in profits from such a price increase or delisting of the brand variants in group 𝛿1 is as 
                                                          
11
 For instance, to construct the prices of newly introduced economy PL kids alternatives, first we calculate the ratio 
between standard PL regular and standard PL kids alternatives, Then, multiply this ratio with economy PL regular 
alternatives to construct economy PL kids prices.  
12
 In the more general case of a finite price change of the alternatives in a group, the relevant formula  for the diversion 
ratio is: 𝐷𝑅𝛿1𝛿2 = −
∑ ∑ (𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑘∈𝛿2
(𝒑𝟏)−𝑠𝑖𝑘(𝒑
𝟎)𝑖 )
∑ ∑ (𝑠𝑖𝑗(𝑗∈𝛿1
𝒑𝟏)−𝑠𝑖𝑗(𝒑
𝟎))𝑖
. If we eliminate the entire group (by setting the 𝑝𝑗 = ∞), then 𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) =
∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗(𝒑
𝟏)𝑖  = 0, so that we obtain (7). 
13
 If we denote the own-price elasticity of product A by 𝜀𝐴 and the cross-price elasticity of product B’s demand with 
respect to A’s price by  𝜀𝐵𝐴), then  the diversion ratio becomes the following: 
 
∆𝑞𝐵
∆𝑞𝐴
⁄ = (𝜀𝐵𝐴𝑞𝐵)/(−𝜀𝐴𝑞𝐴) 
This can be interpreted as the ratio of the cross-price over the own-price elasticity, multiplied by the demand ratio of A 
and B. 
14
 Following the example of Allenby and Rossi (1991), the retailer who seeks to apply this method to solve his pricing 
problem will have access to accurate cost data.  
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follows: 
 ∆𝜋 = ∑ (𝜋𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) − 𝜋𝑗(𝒑
𝟎)) + ∑ (𝜋𝑗′(𝒑
𝟏) − 𝜋𝑗′(𝒑
𝟎))𝑗′𝜖𝛿1𝑗𝜖𝛿1  (8) 
                                                                      Change in profit                          Change in profit 
                                                                      affected products                       remaining products 
 
         = ∑ [(𝑝𝑗
1 − 𝑐𝑗)𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) − (𝑝𝑗
0 − 𝑐𝑗)𝑠𝑗(𝑝
0)]
𝑗∈𝛿1
+ ∑ [(𝑝𝑗′
1 − 𝑐𝑗′) 𝑠𝑗′(𝒑
𝟏) − (𝑝𝑗′
0 − 𝑐𝑗′)𝑠𝑗′(𝒑
𝟎)]
𝑗′𝜖𝛿1
 
(9) 
 where    𝑠𝑗(𝑝) = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗(𝑝)𝑖  and 𝑠𝑗′(𝑝) = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗′(𝑝)𝑖  (10) 
This can be written as: 
 ∆𝜋 = ∑ [(𝑝𝑗
1 − 𝑝𝑗
0)𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) + 𝑚𝑗
0𝑝𝑗
0 (𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) − 𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟎))]𝑗𝜖𝛿1  
                              
                        direct price effect              reduced sales effect 
                                                               for affected alternatives 
                                                                                         
 
(11) 
 + ∑ 𝑚𝑗′
0 𝑝𝑗′
0 (𝑠𝑗′(𝒑
𝟏) − 𝑠𝑗′(𝒑
𝟎))
𝑗′𝜖𝛿1
 
                                                                       increased sales effects  
                                                                    for remaining alternatives 
 
 
 
where  𝑚𝑗
0 =
𝑝𝑗
0−𝑐𝑗
𝑝𝑗
0   and  𝑚𝑗′
0 =
𝑝
𝑗′
0−𝑐
𝑗′
𝑝
𝑗′
0    (12) 
According to equation 11, the profit effect of a price increase or an entire delisting consists of three 
terms. The first term captures the direct profit effect from the price increase on the category profit. 
This term will be zero under an entire elimination of the group (since then 𝒑𝟏 is sufficiently large so 
that 𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) = 0). The second term captures the negative effect on category profits from the reduced 
sales of the products in group 𝛿1. Finally, the last term captures the substitution effect, i.e. the 
positive effect on profits from the increased sales of the other alternatives. 
 The above discussion considered the profit impact of a price increase or delisting, holding 
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the rival prices fixed. In practice, one can also consider the profit impact when the rivals respond. 
As a robustness analysis we consider counterfactuals where rivals respond by half of the initiated 
price increase. This avoids a full equilibrium analysis, which would in any case have to rely on 
various assumptions such as the complicated manufacturer-retailer relationship. 
4. Empirical Results  
Parameter Estimates 
The parameter estimates of our two demand models are presented in Table 2 and 3. The negative 
price coefficient (Asda:-0.982; p<.01; Sainsbury’s:-1.081; p<.01)15, indicates that households are 
overall price sensitive. Still, there is sufficient heterogeneity both observed, as illustrated by the 
significant interactions with the household characteristics, and unobserved (Asda: SD=0.614; p<.01; 
Sainsbury’s: SD=0.534; p<.01), as has also been reported in previous literature (Meza and Sudhir 
2010). Also,  consumer heterogeneity regarding the valuation of the inside goods relative to the 
outside good is observed (Asda: SD=3.024; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: SD=2.888; p<.01). On average, the 
significant random coefficient for the outside good dummy variable indicates that substitution 
between inside goods (current retailer's offerings) is stronger than substitution towards the outside 
good (other retailers' offerings) (Asda: 7.479; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 7.513; p<.01).  Furthermore, the 
more SKUs a retailer offers within a brand variant, the more likely households are to choose the 
brand variant (Asda: 0.062; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 0.085; p<.01) (see Tan and Cadeaux 2011 for 
                                                          
15
Although we include a full set of brand variant fixed effects, price (𝑝𝑗𝑡) might be correlated with unobserved changes 
in brand variant characteristics. To assess this possible endogeneity, we adopt the control function approach (Petrin and 
Train 2010). We use two sets of instruments: (i) weekly commodity price indexes for the main ingredients of RTE 
cereal, namely wheat, barley, oat and sugar, collected by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs U.K.  
interacted with brand variant dummies, as each brand variant has a different composition of main ingredients and (ii)  
the price of the same brand variant at the focal retailer in the previous week (𝑝𝑗𝑡−1) (see Villas-Boas and Winer 1999 for 
a conceptually similar practice). All auxiliary regressions showed acceptable levels for R² (>95%). For both retailers, we 
find that the parameter estimates, and in particular the price coefficient, remain very similar after accounting for the 
correction term for both sets of instruments. This suggests that our specification already accounts well for unobserved 
brand variant characteristics and the role of time-varying unobservables is limited. 
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similar insights). Similarly, the significant positive brand-variant loyalty coefficient (Asda: 11.650; 
p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 11.930; p<.01) reveals that due to state dependence, a brand variant has a higher 
probability of being purchased if a brand variant has been bought on previous purchase occasions, 
supporting prior work (Pauwels et al. 2002 and Geyskens et al. 2010).  
With regard to the brand type*quality tier dummies (relative to outside good option) 
interacted with the household characteristics, substantial heterogeneity across households is 
observed. For instance, households that belong to a low social class (Asda: 0.538; p<.01; 
Sainsbury’s: 0.973; p<.01) and households that spend a larger portion of their cereal budget at the 
retailer are more likely to purchase economy PL options (Asda: 4.333; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 3.015; 
p<.01). Standard PLs are less appealing for households with children (Asda: -0.362; p<.01; 
Sainsbury’s: -0.268; p<.01), and  households’ probability of choosing standard PLs increases if their 
spending portion of their budget at the retailer increases (Asda: 4.526; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 3.652; 
p<.01). Although Geyskens et al. (2010) find that the premium PL appeal is not related to household 
socio-demographics, we find that premium PLs are less appreciated by households with children 
(Asda: -0.627; p<.01; Sainsbury’s:-0.466; p<.01) and are bought by more loyal households (Asda: 
3.872; p<0.01; Sainsbury’s: 3.445; p<0.01). 
With regard to the line dummies (i.e. kids, muesli and health) interacted with household 
characteristics, again significant observed heterogeneity is observed. Among others, the number of 
children has a negative effect on the probability of choosing health (Asda: -0.206; p<.01; 
Sainsbury’s: -0.220; p<.01 and muesli lines (Asda: -0.157; p<.01; Sainsbury’s:-0.137; p<.01), but 
the opposite effect for kids alternatives (Asda: 0.278; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 0.327; p<.01) which is in 
line with Nevo (2001). Furthermore, households that belong to low class tend to be less likely to 
buy healthy alternatives (Asda: -0.127; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: -0.128; p<.01). In contrast, low class 
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households are more likely to choose kids brand variants (Asda: 0.340; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 0.129; 
p<.05). Similarly, household who are more frequently buying cereals at the specific retailer tend to 
be less likely to purchase healthy (Asda: -0.027; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: -0.015; p<.05) cereals. Also, 
the probability of choosing healthy cereals decreases as households’ share of wallet increases for 
Sainsbury’s -0.177; p<.01). However, we find that healthy alternatives in Asda are more appreciated  
if the households’ become more loyal to Asda (Asda: 0.274; p<.01).  
In sum, these findings indicate the importance of accounting for both observed and 
unobserved consumer heterogeneity, in particular regarding the valuation of the price and 
importance of including both line and brand type*tier dummies. Accounting for this type of 
heterogeneity results in more flexible substitution patterns and a first indication that substitution is 
also driven by quality tier, brand types and attributes. We will explore this in much more detail in 
our counterfactuals in the next subsection. 
5. What-if scenarios  
Elimination/introduction of a line within a PL Tier 
Here, we explore the demand and profit implications of adding or dropping (i) a kids line, (ii) a 
health line; and (iii) a muesli line for each PL tier. To disentangle who wins or loses, we compare 
the inside diversion ratios derived from our rich model with observed and unobserved household 
heterogeneity with the “fair share” derived from a simplified model without any household 
heterogeneity (benchmark setting) (see Table A-1 in Appendix). The fair share or benchmark share 
therefore captures the expected changes in market share if the demand of the removed (introduced) 
PL line variant shifts proportionally to (from) each incumbent. A diversion ratio relative higher 
(lower) than the fair share indicates that the tier/line/brand variant wins relatively more (less) 
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demand
16
. 
 Kids line. First, when the kids PL line from the standard PL tier is eliminated (see Table 
A-1 in Appendix), its share is mainly absorbed by the outside good (Asda: 24.30%; Sainsbury’s: 
26.2%), followed closely by standard PL non-kids (Asda: 18.33; Sainsbury’s: 18.70%) and 
mainstream NB non-kids (Asda: 18.8%; Sainsbury’s: 21.8%) options. However, a comparison 
with the benchmark setting shows that all remaining kids options benefit from this elimination. 
For instance, Table 4 shows that mainstream NB and premium NB kids options gain more than 
the fair share. Still, non-kid options within the same quality tier at Sainsbury’s (i.e. standard PL 
tier and mainstream NB) and the same brand type and quality tier at Asda (i.e. standard PL tier) 
gain more than their fair share. These demand switches result in a profit decrease for the retailer 
of 1.9% in Sainsbury’s and even 11.4% in Asda (who offers a broader kids assortment under the 
standard PL tier).  
We are unable to quantify the impact of eliminating the kids PL line in the other two tiers 
(economy and premium PL), since both options are not offered by Asda and Sainsbury’s during our 
observation period.  As such, we consider the effect of hypothetically including the kids PL line in 
these tiers. For the economy PL tier, benchmark setting comparisons reveal that the introduction of 
economy kids alternative in Sainsbury’s strongly hurts retailer’s incumbent kids offerings (all with a 
higher margin), irrespective of the brand-quality type, resulting in a profit decrease -0.05%. 
However, in Asda, this introduction mainly hurts standard PL kids options and results in a profit 
decrease -0.23%. Moreover, the introduction of the kids line in the premium PL tier leads to an 
overall profit decrease -0.07% in Sainsbury’s but profit increase 0.04% in Asda. In Sainsbury’s, 
introduction of premium kids line hurts standard PLs, but also high margin mainstream, premium 
                                                          
16
 For the clarification, we only report the detailed kids line results for one retailer (Asda) in the Appendix. Detailed 
results tables for the health and muesli lines are available on request. 
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NB kids and mainstream NB regular options because of their greater drawing power (Sethuraman 
1995). However, in Asda, this introduction only hurts standard PL regular options.  
Table 4: Overview of kids delisting/introduction 
Sainsbury's 
         
Economy PL Standard PL Premium PL Mainstream NB Premium NB Profit  
Kids Regular Kids Regular Kids Regular Kids Regular Kids Regular 
 
Introduce (=) (- -) (=) N.A. (=) (-) (=) (-) (=) -0.05% 
N.A. (=) Drop (=) N.A. (=) (++) (++) (++) (=) -1.9% 
N.A. (=) (- -) (=) Introduce (=) (- -) (- -) (- -) (=) -0.07% 
           
Asda 
          
Economy PL Standard PL Premium PL Mainstream NB Premium NB Profit  
Kids Regular Kids Regular Kids Regular Kids Regular Kids Regular 
 
Introduce (=) (- -) (- -) N.A. (=) (=) (=) (=) (=) -0.23% 
N.A. (=) Drop (++) N.A. (=) (++) (=) (++) (=) -11.4% 
N.A. (=) (=) (- -) Introduce (=) (=) (=) (=) (=) +0.04% 
Notes: N.A. = not available at the retailer; (=): (diversion ratio – fair share) <0.5; (+) : 0.5 < (diversion ratio – fair 
share) <1; (++) = (diversion ratio – fair share) >1 ; + and - : net profit respectively increases or decreases due to the  
elimination/introduction. 
 
Healthy line. When standard PL healthy brand variants are eliminated at Sainsbury’s, the 
lost share is mainly captured the outside good (36.39%), followed by brands from the standard non-
health (16.20%), premium NB non-health (14.06%) and mainstream NB non-health categories 
(11.37%). Similar patterns are observed for Asda, except that the outside good is the least attractive 
option (15.22% compared to 36.39%). This implies that the healthy standard PL at Sainsbury’s is 
able to attract considerably more cereal sales from competing retailers. Within the retailer, a 
comparison with the benchmark setting shows that the standard PL healthy line cannibalizes its own 
regular options and, in the case of Sainsbury’s (Asda) steal share from the mainstream NB healthy 
(premium NB regular) options (see Table 5). As a result, the elimination of a healthy standard PLs 
leads to a category profit decrease of 2.60% in Sainsbury’s and 0.09% in Asda.  
When the retailer's premium PL healthy line is eliminated (Table 5), we see that the standard 
non-healthy options and mainstream NB healthy options again gain more than in the proportional 
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benchmark setting in Sainsbury’s and only standard regular options gain more than fair shares in 
Asda. Overall, adopting a healthy line under premium PL tier leads to a category profit increase of 
2.84% in Sainsbury’s and 0.04% in Asda.  
Table 5: Overview of health delisting/introduction 
Sainsbury's 
         Economy PL Standard PL Premium PL Mainstream NB Premium NB Profit  
Health Regular Health Regular Health Regular Health Regular Health Regular 
 
Introduce (=) (=) (- -) (=) (=) (=) (-) (=) (=) -0.04% 
N.A. (=) Drop (++) (=) (=) (+) (=) (=) (=) -2.60% 
N.A. (=) (=) (++) Drop (=) (++) (=) (=) (=) -2.84% 
           Asda 
          Economy PL Standard PL Premium PL Mainstream NB Premium NB Profit  
Health Regular Health Regular Health Regular Health Regular Health Regular 
 
Introduce (=) (=) (- -) (=) (=) (=) (=) (=) (=) -0.07% 
N.A. (=) Drop (++) (=) (=) (=) (=) (=) (+) -0.09% 
N.A. (=) (=) (++) Drop (=) (=) (=) (=) (=) -0.04% 
Notes: N.A. = not available at the retailer; (=): (diversion ratio – fair share) <0.5; (+) : 0.5 < (diversion ratio – fair 
share) <1; (++) = (diversion ratio – fair share) >1 ; + and - : net profit respectively increases or decreases due to the  
elimination/introduction. 
 
If we hypothetically introduce an economy health PL alternative, this introduction mainly 
hurts standard PL regular options in both retailers, and mainstream NB regular options in a small 
extent in Sainsbury’s. This results in a category profit decrease of 0.04%. and 0.07% in Sainsbury’s 
and Asda.   
Muesli line. When the muesli line is dropped from the economy PL tier, a comparison of 
diversion ratios with benchmark setting shows that consumers substitute to closest tier’s muesli 
alternatives which is standard PL muesli line. We also find that non-muesli standard PL alternatives 
gain more than their proportional or fair share in Sainsbury’s (see Table 6). This can be expected 
given their strong low-price focus. Although the muesli line under the economy PL tier is able to 
attract considerable consumer demand from competing retailers, offering muesli line under 
economy PL still leads to a category profit decrease of 0.5% in both retailers.  
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Table 6: Overview of muesli delisting/introduction 
Sainsbury's 
         Economy PL Standard PL Premium PL Mainstream NB Premium NB Profit  
Muesli Regular Muesli Regular Muesli Regular Muesli Regular Muesli Regular 
 
Drop (=) (+) (+) (=) (=) (=) (=) N.A. (=) +0.5% 
(=) (=) Drop (+) (++) (=) (+) (=) N.A. (=) -0.3% 
(=) (=) (+) (+) Drop (=) (+) (=) N.A. (=) -0.4% 
           Asda 
          Economy PL Standard PL Premium PL Mainstream NB Premium NB Profit  
Muesli Regular Muesli Regular Muesli Regular Muesli Regular Muesli Regular 
 
Drop (=) (++) (=) (=) (=) (=) (=) N.A. (=) +0.5% 
(=) (=) Drop (+) (=) (=) (=) (=) N.A. (+) +0.08% 
(=) (=) (+) (=) Drop (=) (=) (=) N.A. (=) -0.02% 
Notes: N.A. = not available at the retailer; (=): (diversion ratio – fair share) <0.5; (+) : 0.5 < (diversion ratio – fair 
share) <1; (++) = (diversion ratio – fair share) >1 ; + and - : net profit respectively increases or decreases due to the  
elimination/introduction. 
 
Similarly, when standard PL tier muesli alternatives are delisted from the assortment (see 
Table 6), benchmark comparisons reveal that consumers mainly switch to the closest tiers' with 
muesli alternatives, which are premium PL and mainstream NB in Sainsbury’s. However, some 
consumers prefer to stay in the standard PL tier and switch to standard regular options both in Asda 
and Sainsbury’s. Overall, adopting a muesli line under a standard PL tier leads to a category profit 
increase of 0.3% in Sainsbury’s and profit decrease 0.08% in Asda.   
Moreover, when the muesli line is dropped from the premium PL tier (see Table 6), 
consumers again mainly switch to closest tiers muesli alternatives, which are standard PL and 
mainstream NB. However, standard PL non muesli options also gain some share in Sainsbury’s. In 
total, irrespective of the cannibalization with the standard PL tier, the higher margin premium PL 
labels results again in a profit increase of 0.02% in Asda and 0.4% in Sainsbury’s.  
We can summarize the line extension based findings as follows: When a kids line is 
eliminated/introduced in any PL tier, consumer show overall a more or less loyal pattern to the 
attribute itself and switch to available incumbent kids options irrespective of the brand type (PL vs. 
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NB). In contrast, for the health attribute, the dominant behavior is to switch to regular options of 
standard PL since it is the closest tier in brand-quality type dimension or mainstream NB healthy 
options. And lastly, for the muesli attribute, the dominant behavior is to switch to standard PLs 
regardless of the presence of the attribute. Only at Sainsbury’s, where between PL tier is less strong, 
consumers also switch to other available incumbent muesli options. In addition to this, we see that 
line extensions can be a win-win outcome for retailers since they lead higher profits despite 
cannibalization of incumbent sales. This mitigates the concern of Quelch and Kenny (1994) about 
cannibalization being a serious problem with line extensions (Kadiyali et al. 1998).  
Price changes 
Lastly, we consider the effect of adjustments in the price of PLs for each PL tier. As NBs are, in 
general, higher priced than PLs, the NB-PL price differential [p(NB)-p(PL)] is positive (Sethuraman 
and Gielens 2014). In this respect, Hoch and Lodish (2001) advise retailers to maintain a large price 
gap between PLs (aggregated across tiers) and NBs as it leads to higher PL share by weaning 
consumers away from NBs. Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004) obtain similar findings, where they 
specifically focus on the standard PL tier. In contrast, if one focuses on profitability rather than sales 
or share, a large price gap between PLs and NBs is not necessarily desirable (Sethuraman and Raju 
2012). In fact, if retailers close the objective and perceived quality gap between PLs and NBs, they 
can gain higher profits by also reducing the price gap (Raju, Sethuraman, and Dhar 1995; Sayman, 
Hoch, and Raju 2002). Moreover, Sethuraman and Raju (2012) state in a recent review paper that 
given the profitable outcomes of increasing the price of PLs, ‘the price differential can be reduced to 
near zero?’. However, the price differential (NB vs. PL) cannot be too low or zero, as consumers 
still are willing to pay a premium for NB image, even if they perceive the PL to be equivalent 
(Sethuraman 2003; Applebaum, Gerstner and Naik 2003).  
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Table 7: The impact of alternative price changes on net profit 
 
  
In what follows, we explore the impact of decreasing the gap between standard PLs and 
mainstream NBs by increasing the price of standard PLs by 10% and 20%. These price increases 
result in a demand drop for standard PLs, mainly in favor of mainstream and premium NBs, and the 
outside good. However, these price increases lead overall to a net category profit increase for both 
retailers. For instance, for Sainsbury’s we observe a category profit increase of 7.2% and 13.1% and 
8.5% and 15.1% for Asda (see Table 7). Hence, both retailers and NB manufacturers gain from this 
standard PL price increase, as it leads to a demand shift to NBs accompanied by a profit lift for the 
retailer.  
Furthermore, Sethuraman and Gielens (2014) state that little is known about how premium 
PLs should be priced. Retailers are generally advised to set prices of their premium PLs slightly 
above NBs prices (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007) or at parity (Millward Brown 2008). Items in the 
Scenario’s price increase by   % 
Sainsbury’s Asda 
Profit  Profit 
Below Standard PL Economy PL 
10% 0.60% 1.00% 
30% 1.50% 2.70% 
50% 2.30% 3.90% 
Below Premium PL Standard PL 
10% 7.20% 8.50% 
20% 13.10% 15.10% 
Below Mainstream 
NB 
Premium PL 
10% 2.10% 0.00% 
28% N.A. 0.10% 
Equal to Mainstream 
NB 
Premium PL 
13% 2.40% N.A. 
43% N.A. 0.20% 
Above Mainstream 
NB 
Premium PL 
20% 3.30% N.A. 
50% N.A. 0.20% 
Equal to Premium 
NB 
Premium PL 27% 4.10% N.A. 
Notes: N.A. = not applicable scenarios for the retailer. % price increases are determined by taking into 
account certain price thresholds. For example, 10%, 30% and 50% price increase scenarios still makes the 
economy PL cheaper than standard PL. 
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top tier of a supermarket’s sub-brands are sometimes more expensive than the market leaders 
(World Trademark Review 2012). In our case, both retailers price their premium PLs below the 
NBs. As such, we conduct an experiment by increasing the price of premium PLs in order to 
decrease the price differential between premium PLs and NBs. Accordingly, we explore the 
following four scenario’s: (i) Premium PL price + 10% (ii) Premium PL price equal to Mainstream 
NB price (i.e. + 13% for Sainsbury’s and +43% for Asda) (iii) Premium PL price above Mainstream 
NB price (i.e. +20% for Sainsbury’s and + 50% for Asda) and (iv) Premium PL price equal to 
Premium NB price (i.e. + 27% for Sainsbury’s)17 (see Table 7). Although the price increase of 
premium PLs results in a demand loss for itself, it is mainly in favor of standard PL and mainstream 
NBs and premium NBs. Note that the premium PL changes at Asda are very minor, which is due to 
the very small number of SKU’s (i.e. 3). Our results suggest that a retailer should price its premium 
PLs above the mainstream and even equal to premium NBs in order to improve its net category 
profits. 
The above discussion considered the profit impact of a price increase or delisting, holding the 
rival prices fixed. In practice, one can also consider the profit impact when the rivals respond. As a 
robustness analysis, we consider counterfactuals where rivals respond by half of the initiated price 
increase. For example, if the original initiated scenario is increasing the price of economy PLs by 
10%, we also increase the price of all rivals (standard PL, premium PLs, mainstream and premium 
NBs) by 5%. A similar robustness analysis is done for all scenarios and group of brands. The results 
show that if competitors react by also increasing their prices, the retailer is better off by earning 
even more profits (see Table A-2 in Appendix). 
In addition, we explore the extreme case where PL tier price is increased to infinity which 
                                                          
17
 At Asda, mainstream NBs are, on average, priced above premium NBs (i.e. 3.63 vs. 3.45), so we dropped scenario 4 
for Asda. 
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equals to an elimination of the entire assortment flagged under a PL tier to identify who competes 
with whom (see Table 8). In line with Geyskens et al. (2010), the retailer's standard PL offerings 
benefit proportionately more from dropping the economy PL tier. Economy PL brand variants 
therefore clearly cannibalize the standard PL brand variants. Or in other words, providing an 
economy PL tier shifts consumer demand from the standard PL tier (and to a  much smaller extent 
of premium PL tier in the case of Asda) to the economy alternatives. Still, the economy PL tier is 
able to attract considerable consumer demand from competing retailers, probably the hard 
discounters like Aldi & Lidl (see Vroegrijk et al. 2013). However, in total, deleting the economy 
PLs leads to a category profit increase of 1.9% for Sainsbury’s and even 2.8% for Asda. Similarly, 
when standard PLs are eliminated from the retailer’s assortment, the retailer's premium PLs and 
mainstream NB (and to a smaller extent premium NB in the case of Asda) offerings benefit 
comparatively more from this elimination by attracting more than their benchmark share or fair 
share. Standard PL alternatives mainly compete with the mainstream NBs (same quality tier but 
different brand type) and premium PLs (higher quality tier but same brand type). This first indicates 
that standard PLs are doing what they are designed for, competing with the mainstream NBs (see 
Kumar and Steenkamp 2007), but at the small cost that part of the standard PL demand comes from 
the (higher margin) premium PL alternatives. In line with the economy PL tier, the standard PL tier 
considerably attracts demand from competing retailers. Overall, adopting a standard PL tier leads to 
a category profit increase of 11.9% for Sainsbury’s and 18.3% for Asda. Finally, when retailer’s 
premium PL options are eliminated, the economy PL option is clearly unattractive for premium PL 
buyers, whereas the standard PL tier and mainstream and premium NBs gain share. This indicates 
that premium PLs are cannibalizing the standard PL sales (partly supporting the findings of 
Geyskens et al. 2010), but not the economy PL sales. In this respect, Szymanowski and 
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Gijsbrechts (2012) state that quality variation induced by the higher quality PL lines may dilute the 
signaling value of the standard PL brand. With regard to the economy tier, Palmeira and Thomas 
(2011) show that the quality perception of a value store brand (like the economy PL) are not 
affected by the presence of a premium store brand, which is supported by our findings. Irrespective 
of the cannibalization with the standard PL tier, the higher margin of premium PLs results in a profit 
increase of 3.3% for Sainsbury’s and 0.1% for Asda.  
Table 8: Who competes with whom? 
Sainsbury's 
Economy Standard  Premium  Mainstream  Premium  
Profit 
 PLs PLs PLs NBs NBs 
Infinite price 
increase 
(++) = = = 1.90% 
= 
Infinite price 
increase 
= (++) = -11.90% 
= (++) 
Infinite price 
increase 
= = -3.30% 
            
Asda 
     
Economy Standard  Premium  Mainstream  Premium  
Profit 
 PLs PLs PLs NBs NBs 
Infinite price 
increase 
(++) = = = 2.80% 
= 
Infinite price 
increase 
= (++) = -18.30% 
= (++) 
Infinite price 
increase 
= = -0.10% 
Notes: N.A. = not available at the retailer; (=): (diversion ratio – fair share) <0.5;  (+) : 0.5 < (diversion ratio – fair 
share) <1; (++) = (diversion ratio – fair share) >1 ; + and - : net profit respectively increases or decreases due to the 
elimination/introduction. 
  
Consistent with Sethuraman and Raju (2012) and ter Braak et al. (2013), who refer to premium PLs 
as the high-margin tier, our results also show that the presence of a premium PL tier contributes 
positively to the retailer’s profitability. In the case of Asda, the impact of elimination of the 
premium PL tier is minor, which is due to the very low number of premium PL SKU’s currently 
offered at the retailer. In sum, economy buyers switch mainly to the retailer's standard PL options, 
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whereas standard and premium PL buyers mainly switch to each other as well as NB options. 
Overall, adopting an economy PL tier leads to a category profit decrease, however standard and 
premium PLs positively affects category profits. 
Lastly, given that providing economy tier in the assortment does not generate additional profit 
in all levels (whole tier, line or brand variant), we experiment with the prices of the economy tier by 
increasing the price 10%, 30% and 50% to check whether without dropping the tier, any increase in 
the prices result in a profitable way (see Table 7). Our results also show that although the price 
increase of economy PLs results in a demand loss for itself mainly in favor of standard PL, 
mainstream and premium However, in total economy PL’s price increase leads to a category profit 
increase of 0.6%, 1.5% and 2.3% for Sainsbury’s and 1%, 2.7% and 3.9% for Asda respectively.  
In brief, these price counterfactuals display that a PL price increase, irrespective of the tier, 
results in a further improvement of a retailer’s category profits accompanied with an increased 
demand for the NB alternatives.  
Differences between retailers 
The above findings reveal some interesting differences between our two focal retailers, Sainsbury’s 
and Asda. Overall, in the different scenarios, the competition between the different PL tiers and 
lines turns out to be stronger at Asda relative to Sainsbury’s. This might be driven by the fact that 
the price gap between the three PL tiers is much smaller at Asda than at  Sainsbury’s. As indicated 
by Sethuraman (1995), cross-competitive effects are stronger when the price gap between two 
brands is smaller because the two brands will be more likely to enter a consumer’s consideration set 
(see also Gielens 2012 for a similar reasoning in a new product introduction setting).  
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6. Discussion 
Worldwide, more and more retailers are carrying multiple PL tiers within a category. In fact, the 
importance (and number) of economy and premium PLs, next to the standard PLs, has increased as 
has a range of PL lines focusing on healthy eating, kids and organic foods (Planet Retail 2013). 
However, what are the implications of this ongoing PL proliferation into tiers and lines on 
competition between both PL and NB brand variants in a retailer’s assortment, and subsequently on 
retailer’s profits?  
If we first explore the overall competition between PL tiers (irrespective of PL lines within a 
tier), our findings indicate that economy and premium PL tiers mainly cannibalize the standard PLs, 
which confirms prior insights (Geyskens et al. 2010). On top of this, our study reveals that standard 
PLs partly cannibalize premium PLs. Despite the cannibalization between PLs, all PL tiers are able 
to attract sales from competing retailers, and, except for the economy PLs, to ameliorate category 
profitability. Still, contrary to standard and premium PLs, the acquired low-priced economy PL 
sales, coming not only from competing retailers but form other (higher-priced) alternatives at the 
focal retailer, result in a less profitable situation. On top, our price simulation reveal that retailers 
can strengthen their category profitability by closing the price gap between their PL offerings and 
the NB alternatives. This strategy comes at a cost of losing PL sales but boosts more profitable NB 
sales. Interestingly, a retailer can uplift the profit generated by its economy tier by upgrading its 
price. Likewise, a retailer can further improve its profits by increasing the prices of its standard PL 
products, despite the switch of some of their standard PL buyers to mainstream and premium NBs. 
Similar, a price increase for the premium PL brand variants improves profits.  
Overall, very similar patterns are observed with regard to PL line extensions and deletions 
within a PL tier. All line extensions (i.e. kids, muesli and health) in the premium PL tier cannibalize 
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standard PLs (but not the economy PLs) but, in contrary to the tier level, to also steal business from 
the mainstream and premium NBs with the same attribute (i.e. kids, muesli and health), resulting in 
a profitable outcome. Most standard PL line extensions (i.e. kids, muesli and health) again steal 
demand from own premium PLs (not economy PLs) but also from mainstream NBs and improve 
retailer’s profitability. Only for the economy PLs, our findings indicate that at all levels (i.e. whole 
tier, line and brand variant) retailers do not earn additional profits with their low-priced offerings, 
questioning their excessively large assortment. However, for retailers pursuing objectives other than 
profit maximization, like generating store traffic or competing with hard discounters (see Vroegrijk 
et al. 2013), an appropriate strategy would be to simply reduce this tier's assortment, instead of 
dropping it altogether.  
These findings are consistent with recent business practices. More and more retailers are (i) 
further proliferating their standard and premium PL assortment, and (ii) boosting the price of their 
economy PL alternatives. Firstly, U.S.’s third largest food retailing company Supervalu expanded its 
PL business in 2012 with another 1,500 new products of medium and premium quality, including a 
line of natural and organic foods called Wild Harvest (Market Watch 2012). Likewise, U.S. retailer 
Kroger has expanded its organic and healthy (standard and premium) PL lines recently (Market 
Watch 2012). According to a report of Food Product Design (2015), there is opportunity to increase 
category participation by introducing more premium product lines featuring organic, healthy 
products (Food Product Design 2015). This reasoning is supported by our findings that indicate that 
introducing a healthy line under the premium tier umbrella attracts considerable amount of share 
from competing retailers. 
Secondly, there is an ongoing discussion in the grocery retailing whether introducing economy 
PLs is really a right strategy to fight with discounters and in the end the net effect of this strategy for 
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the retailer is a big question mark in terms of profitability. Koen de Jong who is Managing Partner, 
International Private Label Consult (IPLC) claim that “many mainstream retailers have expanded or 
re-launched their economy PL lines to mitigate the risk of losing shoppers to discounters. However, 
we believe that negative effects may result from this strategy. Economy PLs generate lower margins 
to retailers than NB equivalent PLs. As a result, offering economy PLs may lead to an erosion of 
category profitability due to cannibalizing effects”. Indeed, the top grocery retailers in UK (i.e 
Tesco, Sainsbury’s and Asda) have increased the price of more than 40 per cent on average of their 
economy PLs in the previous years given that rising commodity costs and food inflation put 
pressure on the profitability of the bottom line (Daily Mail 2013). Both Tesco and Sainsbury’s 
indicate that despite price rises, their economy ranges are as popular as ever (Daily Mail 2012).  
Limitations and Further Research 
Our research has several limitations that offer interesting avenues for future research. First of all, 
our analysis focuses only on one FMCG category and two (leading) retailers, which prevents us to 
generalize our findings. Future research should study NB-PL competition across a large set of 
product categories but also within a large set of retailers, in order to generalize our findings, but 
especially to study moderating retailer and category effects. In this respect, ter Braak et al. (2014) 
already reveal that retailers introduce premium PLs in some categories but not in others. 
Second, although the inclusion of the outside good in our model allows for flexible 
substitution towards other retailers’ offerings, further insights are needed into which retailers attract 
these lost sales. For the economy PLs case, one can expect that consumer switch to offerings of 
hard discounters (like Aldi & Lidl) and maybe economy PL offerings of competing traditional 
retailers as economy PLs are strategically introduced to fight with these alternatives (Dekimpe et al. 
2011 and Vroegrijk et al. 2013). Likewise, with regard to for the standard and premium PLs, 
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consumers might switch to traditional retailers’ NBs, but also their standard and premium PL 
offerings. Hence, further research is called for the study this inter- and intra-tier completion not 
only within a retailer but across retailers, helping retailers in further mapping out their own PL 
strategy. 
Third, in our counterfactual analysis, we held the prices of the rival alternatives at the 
retailer constant. In our sensitivity analysis, we already considered partial rival price responses to a 
price increase for a PL alternative, and we find even stronger profit effects. In reality, the prices of 
competing offerings might also increase as a reaction to an entirely new tier/line/brand variant 
delisting (and vice versa for the introduction of a new PL alternative). Future research should further 
study the net result of these simultaneous actions.  
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Table 2: Sainsbury’s Estimation Results 
                                                                                                                                Interactions with household characteristics  
Variables Mean Std. dev   # of children     Low class       Middle class       Buying Frequency       SoW  
         
Price -1.081*** 0.534*** 0.0552*** -0.159*** -0.113*** -0.00273 0.197***  
 (0.0424) (0.0109) (0.0140) (0.0386) (0.0311) (0.00459) (0.0358)  
Outside Good 7.513*** 2.888***       
 (0.161) (0.0642)       
Assortment 0.0854***        
 (0.0103)        
Loyalty 11.93***        
Lines 
(0.0583)        
        
Kids   0.327*** 0.129** 0.0943** -0.0514*** 0.0354  
   (0.0146) (0.0505) (0.0398) (0.00885) (0.0648)  
Health   -0.220*** -0.128*** 0.0139 -0.0155** -0.177***  
   (0.0161) (0.0455) (0.0349) (0.00780) (0.0586)  
Muesli   -0.137*** -0.317*** -0.0865 0.00788 0.474***  
   (0.0294) (0.0804) (0.0589) (0.0128) (0.103)  
Brand type vs. quality tiers  
Economy PL   -0.294*** 0.973*** 0.237 0.126*** 3.015***  
   (0.0876) (0.214) (0.145) (0.0198) (0.150)  
Standard PL   -0.268*** 0.528*** 0.0521 0.0306* 3.652***  
   (0.0772) (0.193) (0.126) (0.0166) (0.116)  
Premium PL   -0.466*** 0.525** 0.134 0.0332 3.445***  
   (0.0863) (0.219) (0.149) (0.0240) (0.179)  
Mainstream NB   -0.175** 0.539*** 0.0479 0.0542*** 3.323***  
   (0.0792) (0.205) (0.137) (0.0198) (0.148)  
Premium NB   -0.382*** 0.572*** 0.141 0.0413** 3.541***  
   (0.0793) (0.204) (0.137) (0.0200) (0.145)  
Brand Variant Dummies Yes        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
Note: The parameter estimates and std.  errors (in parentheses) of the mean effects are shown in the first column. Column 2 shows estimates of the random coefficients, while 
columns 3-6 show estimates of the household characteristics interacted with price and  brand variant characteristics. 
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Table 3: Asda Estimation Results 
                                                                                                                                Interactions with household characteristics  
Variables Mean Std. dev   # of children     Low class       Middle class       Buying Frequency       SoW  
         
Price -0.982*** 0.614*** 0.0990*** -0.00670 0.0518  0.0166*** -0.0716**  
 (0.0409) (0.0107) (0.00968) (0.0354) (0.0320) (0.00336) (0.0319)  
Outside Good 7.479*** 3.024***       
 (0.153) (0.0487)       
Assortment 0.0626***        
 (0.00928)        
Loyalty 11.65***        
Lines 
(0.0492)        
      0.278***      0.340***         0.147***              0.00132      0.183***  
Kids   (0.0101) (0.0383) (0.0338) (0.00504) (0.0488)   
         
Health   -0.206*** -0.127*** -0.186*** -0.0270*** 0.274***  
   (0.0149) (0.0486) (0.0423) (0.00721) (0.0652)  
Muesli   -0.157*** -0.0471 -0.0174 -0.00520 -0.0651   
   (0.0245) (0.0798) (0.0684) (0.0110) (0.101)   
Brand type vs. quality tiers  
Economy PL   -0.247*** 0.538*** 0.445*** 0.0205  4.333***  
   (0.0413) (0.155) (0.139)  (0.0133) (0.116)  
Standard PL   -0.362*** 0.107 0.260* 0.00906  4.526***  
   (0.0401) (0.149)  (0.133) (0.0121) (0.103)  
Premium PL   -0.627*** -0.0601 0.123 0.0226  3.872***  
   (0.0851) (0.268) (0.226) (0.0320) (0.308)  
Mainstream NB   -0.384*** 0.323**  0.416*** -0.0424*** 4.536***  
   (0.0428) (0.159)  (0.142)  (0.0142) (0.126)   
Premium NB   -0.514*** 0.242 0.353** -0.0759*** 4.721***  
   (0.0423) (0.157) (0.140) (0.0139) (0.121)   
Brand Variant Dummies Yes        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
Note: The parameter estimates and std.  errors (in parentheses) of the mean effects are shown in the first column. Column 2 shows estimates of the random coefficients, while 
columns 3-6 show estimates of the household characteristics interacted with price and  brand variant characteristics. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A-1: Introducing/Delisting Kids Lines from the Tiers (Asda) 
  
Economy PL   Standard PL      Premium PL  Mainstream NB Premium NB 
Outside 
Good 
Net 
Profit 
  Kids 
Non-
kids 
Kids 
Non-
Kids 
Kids 
Non-
Kids 
Kids Non-Kids Kids Non-Kids 
    
Diversion Ratio 
Full Model 
Introduce 4.3% 15.6% 17.0% N.A. 0.3% 4.3% 16.7% 8.2% 17.4% 16.2% 
 
Inside Good DR 
Full Model 
Introduce 5.1% 18.6% 20.2% N.A. 0.4% 5.2% 19.9% 9.8% 20.8% 
  
Inside Good DR 
Benchmark 
Introduce 6.6% 17.0% 18.0% N.A. 0.4% 5.2% 21.0% 9.4% 22.5% 
  
∆ Profit 0.1% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% N.A. 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.0% -0.1% 
 
-0.23% 
Diversion Ratio 
Full Model 
N.A. 4.6% Drop 18.3% N.A. 0.3% 5.8% 18.8% 9.9% 17.9% 24.3% 
 
Inside Good DR 
Full Model 
N.A. 6.1% Drop 24.2% N.A. 0.5% 7.6% 24.9% 13.1% 23.7% 
  
Inside Good DR 
Benchmark 
N.A. 7.9% Drop 21.7% N.A. 0.5% 6.2% 25.3% 11.3% 27.1% 
  
∆ Profit N.A. 0.2% -23.7% 3.1% N.A. 0.1% 1.1% 3.3% 1.7% 2.9% 
 
-11.4% 
Diversion Ratio 
Full Model 
N.A. 3.91% 12.90% 15.71% Introduce 0.49% 3.80% 15.49% 6.93% 15.90% 24.87% 
 
Inside Good DR 
Full Model 
N.A. 5.20% 17.17% 20.92% Introduce 0.65% 5.06% 20.62% 9.22% 21.16% 
  
Inside Good DR 
Benchmark 
N.A. 6.61% 16.85% 17.91% Introduce 0.47% 5.32% 21.50% 9.26% 22.08% 
  
∆ Profit N.A. 0.00% -0.01% -0.01% 0.09% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% -0.01% 
 
+0.04% 
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Table A-2: Sainsbury's and Asda net category profits by including competitors' reactions 
Scenario’s price increase by % 
Sainsbury’s Asda 
Profit  Profit 
Below Standard PL 
Economy 
PL 
10% (+) 18% (+) 18% 
30% (+) 52% (+) 51% 
50% (+) 82% (+) 79% 
Below Premium PL 
Standard 
PL 
10% (+) 22% (+) 22% 
20% (+) 42% (+) 42% 
Below Mainstream NB 
Premium 
PL 
10% (+) 22% (+) 19% 
28% N.A. (+) 47% 
Equal to Mainstream NB 
Premium 
PL 
13% (+) 25% N.A. 
43% N.A. (+) 68% 
Above Mainstream NB 
Premium 
PL 
20% (+) 47% N.A. 
50% N.A. (+) 83% 
Equal to Premium NB 
Premium 
PL 
27% (+) 51% N.A. 
Note: Sainsbury's and Asda's net category profit changes are calculated by taking into account competitors' price  
response. We assume that competitors also increase their prices by half of the original brand's price change (e.g. if 
price of the economy PL is changed by 10%, competitors react by changing their prices 5%). 
 
 
A-3 Derivation of choice probabilities 
Assume that household 𝑖 chooses the brand variant 𝑗 that maximizes utility among all the 
available alternatives, conditional on household 𝑖's available choice set. Then the probability that 
household 𝑖 chooses brand variant 𝑗 is given by:  
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗(𝑣𝑖) =
exp (𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡)
1 + ∑ exp ( 𝛾𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑘𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑘𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡)
𝐽
𝑘=1
 (1) 
With unobserved heterogeneity, it is necessary to integrate the conditional choice probability 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗 over the unobserved individual term 𝑣𝑖 (containing the unobserved individual-specific 
valuation of price and the outside good, as discussed in the text). Then, we obtain the random 
coefficients logit choice probability: 
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𝑠𝑖𝑗 = ∫𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗(𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟, 𝜐𝑖)
𝜈
𝑑𝐹(𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟, 𝜐𝑖) (2) 
Following Train (2003), to approximate the integral in (2), we take 𝑅 draws for 𝜐𝑖 from the 
standard normal distribution to obtain average choice probability for each household: 
 𝑠𝑖𝑗
=
1
𝑅
∑
exp (𝛾𝑗
0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑗 + 𝜃𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑗 − (𝛼
0 + 𝜎𝜐𝑖
𝑟)𝑝𝑖𝑗 + (𝑃𝐺𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑝, 𝑝𝑖𝑗)Π𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖)
1 + ∑ exp ( 𝐽𝑘=1 𝛾𝑘
0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑘+𝜃𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑘 − (𝛼0 + 𝜎𝜐𝑖
𝑟)𝑝𝑖𝑘 + (𝑃𝐺𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑝, 𝑝𝑖𝑘)Π𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖)
𝑅
𝑟=1
 
(3) 
 
where Π denotes the matrix of parameters capturing the impact of household characteristics on 
the valuation for the product group dummies 𝑃𝐺𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑝  and price  𝑝𝑖𝑗 (as it denotes 𝛾
ℎ𝑝and 
𝛼ℎ). To estimate the parameters we use the method of simulated maximum likelihood, where the 
choice probabilities (3) form the basis for the likelihood function. 
 
